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Philosophy, Science, Ideology and
the establishment of science as a
profession
David Banks
1 What is true of linguistics in general is true also of that sub-branch of linguistics which
we call ESP. Just as diachronic linguistics can be of help in understanding problems in
synchronic linguistics,  so  understanding  how  a  particular  specialized  genre  has
developed  can  help  in  the  understanding  of  how  that  genre  functions  today.  It  is
therefore  of  interest  to  consider  how scientific  English  came  into  being  in  the  late
seventeenth century, and this study1 fits into that domain. In this article I hope to show
that  the  establishment  of  science  as  a  profession  began  towards  the  end  of  the
seventeenth century, when Isaac Newton was rising to dominance in the scientific world
of that period. I shall first look at the OED entries for a number of lexical items related to
professions  to  see  which  of  them would  have  been appropriate  for  Newton and his
contemporaries. I will then consider in detail two works from the period: Isaac Newton’s
Opticks, and Christiaan Huygens’ Traité de la lumière. I will attempt to show that certain
linguistic features of these works depend on the ideologies which lie behind these two
writers’ differing conceptions of scientific activity, and that this has a bearing on the
establishment of science as a profession. There have been very few contrastive linguistic
studies comparing French and English scientific texts of this period. Gross et al. (2002) is a
rare  example.  They consider  100 ten-line  passages  from the Philosophical  Transactions,
71 from Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, and 27 from Journal des Sçavans. They
discuss style and presentation, relating this to grammatical features. However, when they
quote from the French texts, they do so in English translation. The terminology used in
this article is that of Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1994).
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1. Some lexicological background
2 According to the OED, the adjective professional began life in the early 15th century with a
meaning that is now rare or obsolete, that of “pertaining to or marking entrance to a
religious order”. By 1747 (date of the earliest citation) it was “pertaining to, proper to or
connected with […] one’s profession or calling”, and by 1793, “engaged in one of the
learned or skilled professions, or in a calling considered socially superior […]”. And before
the end of  the 18th century (1798),  it  had attained its  contemporary meaning:  “that
follows an occupation as his […] profession […] or means of livelihood […] applied to one
who follows […] an occupation generally engaged in as a pastime; hence used in contrast
with amateur […]”. The noun professional does not appear until a comparatively late date.
The first OED citation is in 1811 with the meaning of “one who makes a profession or
business  of  any  occupation,  art  or  sport  otherwise  usually  or  often  engaged  in  by
amateurs […]”, and in 1848 it appears as “one who belongs to one of the learned or skilled
professions”. Hence, the word professional, either as adjective or noun, was not one that
was available, in its modern sense, to Newton and his contemporaries.
3 The word profession had been around longer than professional. Like professional, it started
life  with  a  religious  connotation;  a  citation  from 1225  is  given  as “the  declaration,
promise or vow made by one entering a religious order”. Three centuries later (1526) it
has  become  “the  action  of  declaring,  acknowledging,  or  avowing  an  opinion,  belief,
intention, practice, etc.”. By 1541 this has become more precise: “the occupation which
one professes to be skilled in and to follow. A vocation in which a professed knowledge of
some department of learning or science is used […]. Applied […] to the three learned
professions of divinity, law and medicine”. And by 1576 this has been widened to “any
calling or occupation by which a person habitually earns his living”. The OED goes on to
tell  us  that  today this  is  “usually applied to an occupation considered to be socially
superior to a trade or handicraft, but formerly […] including these”. The word profession
then would not have been appropriate for Newton. What he and those like him did, did
not fall  into the domain of divinity, law or medicine. In Newton’s personal case, it is
probably worth remembering, in relation to divinity, that he went to great lengths to
obtain a royal dispensation from the requirement that university dons should take holy
orders. This was directly related to the fact that he was a closet Arian. Since this meant he
did  not  believe  in  the  Trinity,  he  would  have  found it  impossible  to  take  the  vows
necessary to take holy orders in the Anglican Church. He would almost certainly have
been hounded out as a heretic had this become public knowledge (White 1997, Fara 2002,
Gleik 2003).
4 Newton was of course a professor. As early as 1380, the OED has a citation for the meaning
“A public teacher or instructor of the highest rank in a specific faculty or branch of
learning […] who holds an endowed or established chair in a university or one of its
colleges”. Newton became Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge in 1669 at the
amazingly young age of 26. He did not resign from his chair until 1701, although he had
left Cambridge for London in 1696 (White 1997).
5 We would now refer to Newton’s activity as science, but in the 14th century this word
meant “The state or fact of knowing; or cognizance of something specified or implied”
(1340);  during  that  century  it  was  also  applied  to  “knowledge  acquired  by  study;
acquaintance with or mastery of any department of learning”, or “a particular branch of
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knowledge  or  study;  a  recognized  department  of  learning”.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the
branches of study which were generally recognized were known as the seven liberal arts,
and they were grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. It is
only in 1725 that we find it being used “in a more restricted sense: a branch of study
which  is  concerned  either  with  a  connected  body  of  demonstrated  truths  or  with
observed facts systematically classified […] by being brought under general laws […]”. It is
only towards the end of the 19th century (1867) that the contemporary sense of the word
appears:  “In  modern  use,  often  treated  as  synonymous  with  ‘Natural  and  Physical
Science’, and thus restricted to those branches of study that relate to the phenomena of
the material universe and their laws […]”. The OED points out that in the 17th and 18th
centuries, what we now call “science” was then called “philosophy”.
6 The word scientist is of comparatively recent coinage. The first OED citation is from 1834,
with the meaning: “a person with expert knowledge of a science; a person using scientific
methods”. The 1834 quotation is in itself instructive:
We are informed that this difficulty [that they had no collective name] was felt very
oppressively by the members of  the British Association for the Advancement of
Science […]. Philosophers was felt to be too wide and too lofty a term […]. Savans was
rather assuming […] some ingenious gentleman proposed that by analogy with artist
they might form scientist but this was not generally palatable.
7 Despite the feelings of the members of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science, this was, as we now know, the word which stuck.
8 And so to philosophy, whose general meaning is given with a 1340 citation as “the love,
study,  or  pursuit  of  wisdom,  or  of  knowledge  of  things  and  their  causes,  whether
theoretical or practical”, and a little later (1387) as “that more advanced knowledge or
study, to which, in the medieval universities the seven liberal arts were recognized as
introductory;  it  included  the  three  branches  of  natural,  moral,  and  metaphysical
philosophy”.  However  the  meaning  which  equates  “philosophy”  with  “natural
philosophy” has a quotation as early as 1297, with the meaning: “the knowledge or study
of  nature,  or  of  natural  objects  and phenomena […]  now usually  called science”.  The
quotations for this meaning continue until the beginning of the 19th century, but it is
said to be now rare or obsolete.
9 The word philosopher has hardly changed since the early 14th century when it occurs with
the meaning: “a lover of wisdom; one who devotes himself to the search of fundamental
truth; one versed in philosophy or engaged in its study”, but the text goes on to say that it
was used “formerly in a wide sense, including men learned in physical science (physicists,
scientists, naturalists) […]”. Newton is included in that former wide sense. He would have
thought of himself as a philosopher.
 
2. The corpus
10 Newton’s work on mathematics and astronomy fits into the traditional seven liberal arts,
but  not  his  work  on  optics.  While  Newton  had  published  his  mathematical  and
astronomical work in Latin, for his work on optics he turned to English. Huygens initially
welcomed  Newton’s  work,  but  later  rejected  it,  and  he  too  worked  on  optics  and
published it in Traité de la lumière. Newton’s Opticks, described by Gross as “a rhetorical
masterpiece” (1996: 122), was written in the period 1675-1687, but he delayed publication
until  1703.  This  was  probably  due  to  the  reception  which  his  first  paper  on  optics
Philosophy, Science, Ideology and the establishment of science as a profession
ASp, 43-44 | 2004
3
received. This paper, “New Theory about Light and Colors”, written in the then common
epistolary form, was published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society in 1672.
Newton seems to have thought that this paper would be immediately and universally
accepted, and was thus surprised at the mixed reception it attracted. He was already
something of a recluse, and the result was that he withdrew until 1703, that is, until after
the death of Hooke, President of the Royal Society and one of his main critics. It was then
that he published Opticks, and within a few months he was himself elected to take Hooke’s
place  as  President  of  the  Royal  Society  (Bazerman 1988,  Vickers 1987,  White 1997,
Atkinson 1999, Gleik 2003). Opticks had run to a 4th edition by 1730, and this is the edition
usually  used today.  Huygens  published Traité  de  la  lumière in  1690.  This  provides  an
interesting  comparison  between  two  books,  dealing  with  the  same  scientific  topic,
written at more or less the same period, one of which is in English, the other in French.
11 Although Newton and Huygens were both “philosophers”, in the terminology of their
day, they were not practicing the same type of philosophy. That which was practiced by
Newton was  known as  the  experimental  philosophy,  while  that  of  Huygens  was  the
mechanical philosophy (Jones 1982). The experimental philosophy derives from Bacon,
and is based on the principle that experimental data must be sought first, and on their
basis  a  theory  can be  constructed.  The  mechanical  philosophy follows  the  Cartesian
precept that reason is primary, and that experimental data can be subsequently sought to
verify the theory that reason has postulated. The positions of these two authors are clear
from the beginnings of the two works concerned. Newton’s first paragraph begins:
My Design in this Book is not to explain the Properties of Light by Hypotheses, but
to propose and prove them by Reason and Experiments: In order to which I shall
premise the following Definitions and Axioms. (Newton 1979 [1730]: 2)
12 “Hypothesis” has a peculiarly Cartesian ring. The hypothesis was the very basis of the
Cartesian method, so in eschewing the notion of hypothesis from the very beginning,
Newton is obviously and deliberately setting himself up in opposition to the Cartesians.
This peremptory way of setting Cartesianism aside has an almost pugnacious feel about it.
Huygens’ third paragraph contains the following:
J’essaierai  donc  dans  ce  livre,  par  des  principes  reçus  dans  la  Philosophie
d’aujourd’hui,  de  donner  des  raisons  plus  claires  et  plus  vraisemblables,
premièrement de ces propriétés de la lumière directement étendue ; secondement
de  celle  qui  se  réfléchit  par  la  rencontre  d’autres  corps.  Puis  j’expliquerai  les
symptômes des rayons qui  sont dits  souffrir  réfraction en passant par les corps
diaphanes de différente espèce. (Huygens 1992 [1690]: 52)
13 Here,  Philosophie  d’aujourd’hui can only refer to Cartesianism,  and indeed Descartes is
referred  to  in  the  following  paragraph  and  frequently  throughout  the  book.  Thus
Newton’s and Huygens’ opposing viewpoints on scientific method are clear from the very
start.
14 The corpus consists of three extracts from each of the books. The first extract is the
beginning of the book, and includes the above quotations. The second is from what I
would term an experimental section,  although as will  be seen,  this means something
rather different for each of our two authors. The third section is more of a discussion
section, but deals with the same subject in each case: the section in Opticks is headed
Observations concerning the Reflexions, Refractions and Colours of thin transparent Bodies, while
that in Traité de la lumière has the heading Des figures des corps diaphanes Qui servent à la
Réfraction, et à la Réflexion. The three extracts from Newton will be labelled N1, N2, N3, and
those from Huygens, H1, H2, H3. The number of words in the corpus is as follows:
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N1 N2 N3 N total
1459 1789 1493 4741
H1 H2 H3 H total
1806 1977 2048 5831
  Grand total 10,572
15 In what follows, I shall consider two linguistic features: personal pronouns functioning as
subject, and nominalized processes. A wider range of linguistic features is considered in
Banks (forthcoming).
 
3. Personal pronoun subjects
16 In Newton’s text the pronouns which occur as subject are I and you. In Huygens’ text, je, 
nous and on are all used as subject pronouns. Table 1 gives the numbers and frequencies of
these pronouns functioning as subject. The figures for Newton include 8 cases of ellipted I
. 
 
Table 1. Personal pronouns functioning as subject
Newton I you total
number 59 5 64
per 1000 words 12.4 1.1 13.5
per 100 finite verbs 17.3 1.5 18.8
Huygens je nous on total
number 27 17 45 89
per 1000 words 4.6 2.9 7.7 15.3
per 100 finite verbs 4.9 3.1 8.2 16.2
17 It  will  be  noted  while  overall  figures  are  similar  for  the  two  authors,  in  terms  of
frequency,  Huygens  uses  more  personal  pronoun  subjects  judged  according  to  the
number of words, but Newton uses more measured according to the number of finite
verbs. This is due to the rather longer and more complex sentence structure used by
Huygens. The pronouns which occur in Newton are dominated by I, the occurrence of you
being  marginal,  8% of  Newton’s  personal  pronoun  subjects.  In  Huygens  all  three
pronouns,  je,  nous and  on,  occur  in  non-negligible  proportions,  30%,  19%,  and  51%
respectively. It could be argued that Newton’s text is more personalized, having a greater
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emphasis on the I pronoun which thus plays a more central role than je does in Huygens’
text.
18 Despite the overall numbers of pronouns, differences emerge when their distribution by
process type, that is, the process type of the verb of which they are subject, is considered.
In the following tables, you has been eliminated because of the small number involved,
and the figures for I do not include ellipted examples.
 
Table 2. Personal pronoun subjects by process type
 
Newton – I
 Material Mental Relational Verbal
N1 - 8 - 8
N2 13 5 2 -
N3 2 10 - 3
N Tot. 15 23 2 11
 29% 45% 4% 22%
 
Huygens – je
 Material Mental Relational. Verbal
H1 - 6 2 8
H2 1 2 - 4
H3 - 1 - 3
H Tot. 1 9 2 15
 4% 33% 7% 56%
 
Huygens – nous 
 Material Mental Relational Verbal
H1 - 3 1 -
H2 - 2 - 3
H3 - 2 - 4
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H Tot. - 7 1 7
 - 47% 7% 47%*
* Discrepancies due to rending
 
Huygens – on
 Material Mental Relational Verbal
H1 - 9 3 -
H2 3 5 9 1
H3 - 10 2 3
H Tot. 3 24 14 4
 7% 53% 31% 9%
19 Mental process is the most common process type which occurs with all of these pronouns;
it accounts for 45% of Newton’s I,  and 33%, 47% and 53% of Huygens’ je,  nous and on
respectively. From this point of view the two authors might be thought of as similar;
however,  the  second most  common process  type  for  Newton’s  I is  material  process,
accounting for 29%, whereas, material process is rare for all three of Huygens’ pronoun
subjects. This reflects the fact that in Newton’s text the argument is based on experiment,
that is, on someone doing things; in Huygens’ text no-one does anything. Facts are known
and reasoning takes place on the basis of these facts. The comparative absence of material
process in the case of Huygens is to some extent compensated by the presence of verbal
process with je (56%), and nous (47%), and relational process with on (31%). In the case of
Newton’s I, verbal process occurs to some degree (22%), but rather less than with je and
nous, and relational process is rare.
20 The fact that these figures reflect the experimental and Cartesian standpoints of these
two authors can be illustrated with the following extracts:
In a very dark Chamber, at a round Hole, about one third part of an Inch broad,
made in the Shut of a Window, I placed a Glass Prism, whereby the Beam of the
Sun’s Light, which came in at that Hole, might be refracted upwards toward the
opposite Wall of the Chamber, and there form a colour’d Image of the Sun. The Axis
of the Prism (that is, the Line passing through the middle of the Prism from one end
of it to the other end parallel to the edge of the Refracting Angle) was in this and
the following Experiments  perpendicular  to the incident Rays.  About this  axis  I
turned the Prism slowly, and saw the refracted Light on the Wall, or coloured Image
of the Sun, first to descend, and then to ascend. Between the Descent and Ascent,
when the Image seemed Stationary, I stopp’d the Prism, and fix’d it in that Posture,
that it should be moved no more. (Newton 1979 [1730]: 27-28)
21 Here we find a description of an experiment. Newton is carrying out this experiment
himself, and so he is doing things: “I placed a Glass Prism […] I turned the Prism slowly […
]  I  stopp’d  the  Prism,  and fix’d  it”.  Moreover,  Newton’s  action is  purposeful  action:
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“whereby the Beam […] might be refracted upwards […] and there form a color’d image”.
And Newton is the observer of this, as when he “saw the refracted light”. Compare this
with a passage from Huygens:
Premièrement donc quand la matière éthérée ne pénétrerait aucunement les corps
transparents, leurs particules mêmes se pourraient communiquer successivement
le mouvement des ondes, de même que celles de l’Ether ; étant supposées, comme
celles-ci, de nature à faire ressort. Et cela est aisé à concevoir pour ce qui est de
l’eau, et des autres liqueurs transparentes, comme étant composées de particules
détachées. Mais il peut sembler plus difficile à l’égard du verre, et des autres corps
transparentes  et  durs ;  parce  que  leur  solidité  ne  semble  pas  permettre  qu’ils
puissent  recevoir  du  mouvement  que  dans  toute  leur  masse  à  la  fois.  Ce qui
pourtant n’est pas nécessaire, parce que cette solidité n’est pas telle qu’elle nous
parait ; étant probable que ces corps sont plutôt composés de particules, qui ne sont
que posées les unes auprès des autres, et retenues ensemble par quelque pression
de  dehors  d’une  autre  matière,  et  par  l’irrégularité  des  figures.  (Huygens  1992
[1690]: 75-76)
22 In this corresponding passage from Huygens, he talks a great deal about the physical
phenomena: “la matière éthérée ne pénétrerait aucunement les corps transparents […] étant
composées de particules détachées […] leur solidité ne semble pas permettre […] ces corps sont
plutôt composés de particules”, but neither Huygens, nor any other experimenter, intervene




23 Nominalized processes are a form of grammatical metaphor (Halliday 1994). The normal
or congruent way of encoding a process is by means of a verb. If some other method is
used, such as a noun, then this constitutes an example of grammatical metaphor. This is
syntactically significant since the nominalized form has all the syntactic characteristics
of  a  noun:  it  can be modified and qualified,  it  can function as  subject,  complement,
prepositional completive, etc. It also takes on some of the semantic characteristics of the
noun, that is, it is to some extent reified or objectified, thus giving it more permanence
than the corresponding verbal form. Partly for these reasons, it has taken on particular
significance in scientific writing (Halliday 1988, 1998, Halliday & Martin 1993, 2 Banks
1999, 2001, 2003).
24 In overall terms, Newton’s and Huygens’ use of nominalized processes is similar. This can
be seen in Table 3.
 
Table 3. Nominalized Processes
 
Newton 
 Material Mental Relational Verbal Total
Tokens 121 9 8 3 141
Types 24 7 6 3 40
% tokens 85.8 6.4 5.7 2.1  
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% types 60.0 17.9 15.4 7.7  
Token/Type 5.0 1.3 1.3 1.0 3.5
Tokens/1000 words 25.5 1.9 1.7 0.6 29.7
 
Huygens 
 Material Mental Relational Verbal Total
Tokens 116 36 8 1 161
Types 31 18 8 1 58
% tokens 73.4 20.9 5.1 0.6  
% types 53.4 31.0 13.8 1.7  
Token/Type 3.7 1.8 1.0 1.0 2.7
Tokens/1000 words 19.9 6.2 1.4 0.2 27.6*
* Discrepancies due to rounding
25 As can be seen, Newton uses 29.7 nominalized processes per 1000 words, while Huygens
uses 27.2. Newton also tends to reuse his nominalizations more than Huygens does. On
average, Newton uses each of his nominalization types 3.5 times, whereas Huygens uses
his  2.7 times.  Since  nominalized processes  frequently  constitute  technical  terms,  this
might be seen as an indication that Newton is building up a technical vocabulary to a
greater degree than Huygens. When these figures for nominalization are distributed by
process type further differences begin to emerge. The figures for relational and verbal
process are small, even marginal, and of the same order for both authors. The majority of
nominalized processes are material: for Newton this is 86%, for Huygens, although still
the majority, it is rather less, 73%. More significantly Huygens uses a comparatively large
proportion  (21%)  of  nominalized  mental  processes,  while  only  6%  of  Newton’s
nominalized  processes  are  mental.  This  indicates  that  whereas  in  Newton’s  case
nominalization is  very largely a  question of  material  processes,  other processes only
being nominalized to a marginal extent, in Huygens’ case, although material processes
are  nominalized to  an extensive  degree,  mental  processes  are  also  nominalized to  a
significant extent. Thus in Huygens, the reasoning process itself is nominalized, a feature
which  is  rare  in  Newton’s  text,  which  virtually  restricts  nominalization  to  physical
phenomena.
This is illustrated by the following extracts:
Refrangibility of the Rays of Light, is their Disposition to be refracted or turned
out of their Way in passing out of one transparent Body or Medium into another.
And a greater or less Refrangibility of Rays, is their Disposition to be turned more
or less out of their Way in like Incidences on the same Medium. Mathematicians
usually consider the Rays of Light to be Lines reaching from the luminous Body to
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the  Body  illuminated,  and  the  refraction of  those  Rays  to  be  the  bending or
breaking of those lines in their passing out of one Medium into another. And thus
may Rays and Refractions be considered, if Light be propagated in an instant. But
by an Argument taken from the Æquations of the times of the Eclipses of Jupiter’s
Satellites, it seems that Light is propagated in time, spending in its passage from
the Sun to us about seven Minutes of time: And therefore I have chosen to define
Rays and Refractions in such general terms as may agree to Light in both cases.
(Newton, 1979 [1730]: 2)
26 In this 176-word extract from Newton’s text, there are 14 cases of nominalization (printed
in bold above), of which 13 are material processes, and only one mental (argument).
La plupart de ceux qui ont écrit touchant les différentes parties de l’Optique se sont
contentés de présupposer ces vérités. Mais quelques-uns plus curieux en ont voulu
rechercher l’origine, et les causes, les considérant elles-mêmes comme des effets
admirables de la Nature. En quoi ayant avancé des choses ingénieuses, mais non pas
telles  pourtant que les  plus intelligents  ne souhaitent  des explications qui  leur
satisfassent davantage, je veux proposer ici ce que j’ai médité sur ce sujet,  pour
contribuer  autant  que  je  puis  à  l’éclaircissement de  cette  partie  de  la  Science
naturelle, qui non sans raison en est réputée une des plus difficiles. Je reconnais
être  beaucoup  redevable  à  ceux  qui  ont  commencé  les  premiers  à  dissiper
l’obscurité  étrange  où  ces  choses  étaient  enveloppées,  et  à  donner  espérance
qu’elles se pouvaient expliquer par des raisons intelligibles. (Huygens 1992(1690):
51-52)
27 In this  136-word extract  from Huygens’  book,  there are 8 cases of  nominalization,  of




28 Thus  we  see  that  both  of  the  features  studied  here  – the  use  of  personal  pronouns
subjects, and the nominalization of processes – betray the differing stances of these two
authors.  Newton’s  philosophy  is  empirical,  in  the  spirit  of  Bacon  and  his  own
contemporary,  Locke;  his  thought  processes  are  inductive,  starting  with  the  data
provided by experiment and building his theory on that basis. Huygens’ philosophy is
Cartesian, and consequently deductive; reason is primary and used to establish a theory
which then may be tested against the available data. Of course it is true that these stances
were not totally “pure”; Newton was probably aware of the sort of theory towards which
he was moving, even while carrying out his experiments, and Huygens was presumably
aware of the available evidence even while carrying out his reasoning. Nevertheless, the
two stances remain diametrically opposed, and the difference of viewpoint is stark. 
29 The fact that these differences of standpoint filter down to the way in which the language
is encoded is particularly interesting in the context of a systemic functional approach to
language. According to systemic functional theory, the level at which the language is
encoded in speech or writing, the lexicogrammar, is determined by the semantic level, in
terms of three semantic metafunctions, ideational, interpersonal and textual. This level
in turn is determined by the level of context, labelled, genre or register, in terms of field,
tenor and mode, and some commentators here distinguish two separate levels. This level
itself is determined by ideology. This is sometimes presented in diagrammatic form as
concentric circles (Martin 1992) or triangles (Eggins 1994).
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Fig.1. Representation of systemic functional approach to language 
adapted from Eggins (1994)
30 These two texts by Newton and Huygens provide an interesting illustration of the way
ideology, here in the form of empirical and Cartesian philosophies, filters down to the
level of lexicogrammar, thus affecting the way in which the language is encoded. This is
true even though at the level of genre they are virtually identical. They both have the
same field, the physical properties of light; they have the same tenor, communication
with their peers in the European scientific community of the time; and they have the
same mode, a written document intended to be read silently and linearly. So it would
appear that the affect of the ideological level on the lexicogrammar can be felt even
though there is little effect at the level of genre, which is the same for both of these texts.
And then… 
31 The next chapter in this story is that shortly afterwards French scientists abandoned the
Cartesian approach, and adopted the empirical method. Thus natural philosophy was set
on the road which was to lead to its being renamed as “science”, and today it is difficult to
conceive of scientific activity other than in inductive terms. Those who remained on the
Cartesian side of the fence remained within the domain of philosophy. This is why today
we think of Newton and his fellow experimenters as belonging to the history of science,
but we consider that Descartes and his followers belong to the history of philosophy.
Newton and Huygens’ were working and writing at that crucial moment in history when
what was to become science began to split off from philosophy. Thus we can genuinely
talk about the beginnings of a new profession and the seeds of a new discipline. 
 
Conclusion
32 Study of the relevant OED entries shows that the words professional, and profession were
not available to Newton in the relevant sense to describe himself and his activity; he was
however a professor.  Nor was the word science available in the relevant sense, and the
word scientist was  not  coined until  much later.  Newton would have called himself  a
philosopher, and his activity was a branch of philosophy. Study of extracts from Newton’s
Opticks and Huygens’ Traité de la lumière shows that Newton uses the first person pronoun,
I, much more frequently than Huygens’ uses je, but that in addition, Huygens uses nous 
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and on. Newton uses I with a significant number of material processes, whereas material
process is rare with Huygens’ personal pronoun subjects. On the other hand, with je and 
nous he uses a certain number of verbal processes, and with on, relational processes. Both
Newton and Huygens use the nominalization of processes to a similar degree, but Newton
nominalizes  material  process  rather  more  than  Huygens,  and  Huygens  nominalizes
mental process much more than Newton. These differences reflect Newton’s empirical
inductive stance, as opposed to the Cartesian deductive stance of Huygens. In terms of a
systemic functional model, this means that the level of ideology is affecting the level of
lexicogrammar. In this we can see the beginnings of the establishment of science as a
discipline. And the word discipline brings us back to the OED which tells us that this word
started life in the 14th century as “instruction imparted to disciples or scholars”. 
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2. Halliday (1988) is reprinted as a chapter of Halliday & Martin (1993).
ABSTRACTS
This paper fits into the context of the beginnings of scientific English. Study of OED entries shows
that Newton would have described himself as a “philosopher”. The paper compares two features
of  Newton’s  Opticks,  written  1675-1687,  and  Huygens’  Traité  de  la  lumière,  published  in  1690:
personal pronoun subjects, and nominalized processes. Newton uses I as subject, while Huygens
uses je, nous, and on. Both Newton and Huygens use nominalized processes, to a similar extent,
but  Huygens  nominalizes  mental  processes  much more  frequently  than  Newton does.  These
features are the lexicogrammatical realization of ideological differences. Shortly after this period
francophone scientists were to adopt the empirical approach, laying the foundations of what
would  become  the  discipline  of  “science”.  Those  who  continued  to  follow  the  precepts  of
Cartesianism remained in the field of “philosophy”.
Cet article a pour cadre le contexte des origines de l’anglais scientifique. Une étude des entrées
de l’OED révèle que Newton se serait considéré comme un philosophe. L’article compare deux
traits linguistiques présentés dans l’Opticks de Newton, écrit entre 1675 et 1687, et le Traité de la
lumière de Huygens, publié en 1690 :  les pronoms personnels sujets et les procès nominalisés.
Newton utilise  I comme sujet,  tandis  que  Huygens  emploie  je, nous,  et  on.  Ces  deux auteurs
utilisent  les  procès  nominalisés  à  un  degré  similaire,  mais  Huygens  nominalise  les  procès
mentaux beaucoup plus fréquemment que Newton. Ces traits linguistiques sont la réalisation
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lexicogrammaticale  de  différences  idéologiques.  Peu  de  temps  après  cette  période,  les
scientifiques francophones devaient adopter l’approche empirique, créant ainsi les bases de ce
qui  deviendrait  la  discipline  de  la  « science ».  Ceux  qui  continuèrent  à  suivre  les  principes
cartésiens restaient dans le champ de la « philosophie ».
INDEX
Mots-clés: Huygens (Christiaan), idéologie, linguistique diachronique, Newton, nominalisation,
pronom personnel
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